Wednesday, January 11, 2006
Anne Phillips, Which Equalities Matter? Chapter 3 Reading notes and questions
In this chapter, Phillips explores the issue of economic inequality *in itself* (the issue of the relation between political and economic inequality is saved for chapter 4). There are two questions that we need to consider, coming at the problem from different directions:
1) Should we care at all about economic inequality?
2) When, and to what degree, is economic inequality acceptable?
These questions come at the issue from two different directions, the first assuming the default position is that this isn't an issue, and the second assuming it is. Phillips is fairly certain the answers are probably going to turn out to be "yes" and "sometimes." The key, then, is figuring out precisely why and when and to what degree we care (and, as she notes toward the end of the chapter, what can reasonably be done about it without making matters worse.
Along the way to her own argument, Phillips nicely introduces several key figures and approaches to the problem of inequality in contemporary political philosophy. It is these figures and approaches I'd like us to discuss.
First, we're introduced to Marx on equality, and it turns out Marx thinks equality is a rather silly idea. And boring. And pointless. Her take on this is spot-on, I think, and I recommend those few pages on Marx with a great deal of enthusiasm.
But the Marx discussion is rather beside the point--she quickly moves on to contemporary philosophy on inequality, beginning with Rawls.
Rawls approach to inequality can be found on pg. 49. Rawls' disembodied brains behind the veil of ignorance prefer simple equality--except: "that all social primary goods are to be distributed equally unless an uneqaul distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advntage of the least favoured" (Phillips, 49)
Question on this point: What does Rawls mean here? More interestingly, how much inequality would this actually allow? Is this clear?
Setting aside for the moment the practicality or interpretability (is that a word?) of this test: do you think it makes sense as a principle? Why/why not?
Moving on, Dworkin (see pg. 55) gives us the misleadingly titled "Equality of Resources" which really means we'll have lots of unequal amounts of various resources, but it's OK if and only if what we have is a logical consequence of the choices we made, AND we made those choices from an initial position of equality. If we choose to invest heavily in alcohol and skimp on fire insurance to do so, and we find ourselves without a home for this reason, that's a form of inequality that society can handle. I only discussed this briefly in class today, so let me say something I should have: an obvious strength of this approach is that it offers a great deal of respect to the preferences of members of society to decide what's good for them. This seems to dovetail nicely with Phillip's notion that "inherent equal worth" is central to the sort of equality that democracy requires.
That said, what do you think of this idea? Other problems/strengths?
(and furthermore: while the clamshell auction make work marvelously on the desert island in his analogy work in an already established society?)
That's all the further we got in class today, but next week when we return we'll look at the rest of the chapter, which includes the following approaches:
The sufficiency approach (Frankfurt, Raz, similar to an idea called "Universal Basic Income promoted by the Belgian political philosopher Phillipe van Parijs--here's a story about van Parijs' idea and some related ones, and here's a link to an organization devoted to promoting the idea in the United States. Van Parijs' most famous paper on the topic is called "Should Surfers be Fed?" which explains why they let him put this picture on the cover of his book.)
Phillips thinks the sufficency approach takes us away from inequality. Why are the sufficiency theorists willing to go there?
I know you will be tempted to comment on your suspicion that this plan is deeply infeasible. I understand that strong urge, but encourage you to resist, and think instead about it's more philosophical strengths and weaknesses.
Finally, we have one of my personal favorites: Michael Walzer's complex equality (64-65). The basic idea here--inequality in any one sphere of life is no big deal as long as you follow the rules to get it. Get rich as an entreprenour, win the election and become president, charm the most attractive person in town into marrying you--great! Just don't use your riches to influence politics, use your political position to enrich your friends, or get a good job because of your spouse. It's using success in one sphere to influence another that we don't like.
What do you think of this approach? If we could contain an extreme amount of economic inequality in this way, would it be permissible?
More posts on the rest of the book coming soon.
1) Should we care at all about economic inequality?
2) When, and to what degree, is economic inequality acceptable?
These questions come at the issue from two different directions, the first assuming the default position is that this isn't an issue, and the second assuming it is. Phillips is fairly certain the answers are probably going to turn out to be "yes" and "sometimes." The key, then, is figuring out precisely why and when and to what degree we care (and, as she notes toward the end of the chapter, what can reasonably be done about it without making matters worse.
Along the way to her own argument, Phillips nicely introduces several key figures and approaches to the problem of inequality in contemporary political philosophy. It is these figures and approaches I'd like us to discuss.
First, we're introduced to Marx on equality, and it turns out Marx thinks equality is a rather silly idea. And boring. And pointless. Her take on this is spot-on, I think, and I recommend those few pages on Marx with a great deal of enthusiasm.
But the Marx discussion is rather beside the point--she quickly moves on to contemporary philosophy on inequality, beginning with Rawls.
Rawls approach to inequality can be found on pg. 49. Rawls' disembodied brains behind the veil of ignorance prefer simple equality--except: "that all social primary goods are to be distributed equally unless an uneqaul distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advntage of the least favoured" (Phillips, 49)
Question on this point: What does Rawls mean here? More interestingly, how much inequality would this actually allow? Is this clear?
Setting aside for the moment the practicality or interpretability (is that a word?) of this test: do you think it makes sense as a principle? Why/why not?
Moving on, Dworkin (see pg. 55) gives us the misleadingly titled "Equality of Resources" which really means we'll have lots of unequal amounts of various resources, but it's OK if and only if what we have is a logical consequence of the choices we made, AND we made those choices from an initial position of equality. If we choose to invest heavily in alcohol and skimp on fire insurance to do so, and we find ourselves without a home for this reason, that's a form of inequality that society can handle. I only discussed this briefly in class today, so let me say something I should have: an obvious strength of this approach is that it offers a great deal of respect to the preferences of members of society to decide what's good for them. This seems to dovetail nicely with Phillip's notion that "inherent equal worth" is central to the sort of equality that democracy requires.
That said, what do you think of this idea? Other problems/strengths?
(and furthermore: while the clamshell auction make work marvelously on the desert island in his analogy work in an already established society?)
That's all the further we got in class today, but next week when we return we'll look at the rest of the chapter, which includes the following approaches:
The sufficiency approach (Frankfurt, Raz, similar to an idea called "Universal Basic Income promoted by the Belgian political philosopher Phillipe van Parijs--here's a story about van Parijs' idea and some related ones, and here's a link to an organization devoted to promoting the idea in the United States. Van Parijs' most famous paper on the topic is called "Should Surfers be Fed?" which explains why they let him put this picture on the cover of his book.)
Phillips thinks the sufficency approach takes us away from inequality. Why are the sufficiency theorists willing to go there?
I know you will be tempted to comment on your suspicion that this plan is deeply infeasible. I understand that strong urge, but encourage you to resist, and think instead about it's more philosophical strengths and weaknesses.
Finally, we have one of my personal favorites: Michael Walzer's complex equality (64-65). The basic idea here--inequality in any one sphere of life is no big deal as long as you follow the rules to get it. Get rich as an entreprenour, win the election and become president, charm the most attractive person in town into marrying you--great! Just don't use your riches to influence politics, use your political position to enrich your friends, or get a good job because of your spouse. It's using success in one sphere to influence another that we don't like.
What do you think of this approach? If we could contain an extreme amount of economic inequality in this way, would it be permissible?
More posts on the rest of the book coming soon.
# posted by djw @ 6:53 AM 
Comments:
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In my opinion, it is important to have a basic understanding of economic inequality and how if affects our societal structure, thus caring a little. I would agree with a statement by Michael Waltzer about this topic. He writes that pursuing literal equality promotes a "leveled and conformist society." The theoretical acceptance of a "level playing field" for all would completely submerged those individual and group differenes (inequalities) that make us unique.
In the section on Rawls, he is suggesting that those that are less fortunate or at a disadvantage be allowed to accept more of the distributed goods because it will benefit them more.
In my opinion, this theory is not exactly clear because amount of distributive goods (cause) is based upon what the benefit (effect) to the disadvantage will be. It is quantifying the benefit that is difficult. I think it would allow a significant amount of inequality. Everyone would be wanting a piece of the pie.
The sufficiency idea is grey. The question then becomes what is sufficient for each? Obviously, the answer to this is based on self interest. What may be sufficient for one is not for another. Equality would suggest that this approach be guided with a reasonable/unreasonable test. It may be sufficient, but is it reasonable?
I very much like the basic premise of Waltzer's complex equality arguement. It allows people to really earn what they have worked hard for, rather than being afforded significant opportunitites, income, wealth, or possessions from another. What's interesting about this however, is that those that are wealthy and/or powerful, often influence others that are out of their sphere in order to maintain their wealth level. An example would be the big business man who wines and dines the politician in order to keep a particular law from passing because it would stronly impact that business man's company. That's why this idea would never work!
In the section on Rawls, he is suggesting that those that are less fortunate or at a disadvantage be allowed to accept more of the distributed goods because it will benefit them more.
In my opinion, this theory is not exactly clear because amount of distributive goods (cause) is based upon what the benefit (effect) to the disadvantage will be. It is quantifying the benefit that is difficult. I think it would allow a significant amount of inequality. Everyone would be wanting a piece of the pie.
The sufficiency idea is grey. The question then becomes what is sufficient for each? Obviously, the answer to this is based on self interest. What may be sufficient for one is not for another. Equality would suggest that this approach be guided with a reasonable/unreasonable test. It may be sufficient, but is it reasonable?
I very much like the basic premise of Waltzer's complex equality arguement. It allows people to really earn what they have worked hard for, rather than being afforded significant opportunitites, income, wealth, or possessions from another. What's interesting about this however, is that those that are wealthy and/or powerful, often influence others that are out of their sphere in order to maintain their wealth level. An example would be the big business man who wines and dines the politician in order to keep a particular law from passing because it would stronly impact that business man's company. That's why this idea would never work!
# posted by 
: 11:46 AM
: 11:46 AM
Michael Walzer's writing makes it clear that he's keenly aware and troubled by precisely the problem you identity--while his theory of complex equality might be philosophically sound in saying no degree economic inequality is too great as long as it doesn't cross over to other spheres, it may well be sociologically untenable. Which, some might argue, leaves us back where we started.
I, too, find a great deal of intuitive appeal in complex equality. But the more you think about it, the more problems come up. More on Wednesday.
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I, too, find a great deal of intuitive appeal in complex equality. But the more you think about it, the more problems come up. More on Wednesday.
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